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100 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Leibniz, by Perkins]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle]
The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Leibniz, by Frege]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K on Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Nature uses the infinite everywhere [Leibniz]
A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Leibniz, by Jolley]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil]
If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Leibniz, by Swoyer]
Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 9. Qualities
Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Leibniz, by Adams,RM]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle]
Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis]
A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe]
Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle]
Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances are essentially active [Leibniz, by Jolley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Leibniz, by Garber]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Leibniz, by Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Leibniz was not an essentialist [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them [Leibniz]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Leibniz, by Hacking]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré]
Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt]
Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Leibniz, by Perkins]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Leibniz, by Jolley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers [Leibniz]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Leibniz, by Martin/Barresi]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Leibniz, by Jolley]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Leibniz, by Perkins]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Leibniz, by Gardner]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Leibniz, by Jolley]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Leibniz, by Jolley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Leibniz, by Garber]
Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley on Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Leibniz, by Pasnau]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Leibniz, by Garber]
The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 10. Closure of Physics
Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Leibniz, by Scruton]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Leibniz, by Stewart,M]